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Evaluating Peace Agreements: The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1994, 16 Years Later: A Jordanian Perspective

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ABSTRACT

This study aims at assessing and analyzing the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement of 1994, and the parties' subsequent relationship as well as their compliance mainly from a Jordanian perspective. This study argues that although both parties have been highly motivated to forge peaceful and functional relations, developments within the regional context of the Arab-Israeli conflict particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been playing a detrimental role in shaping the pace and nature of the Jordanian-Israeli ties since signing their peace treaty in 1994. Moreover, although a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement has not been achieved yet, both Jordan and Israel continued to show their commitment to the peace treaty and that a mixture of up and downs has been characterising the order of Jordanian-Israeli relations. The major bulk of this study is a discussion to the peace treaty of 1994, Jordanian and Israeli motivations and subsequent relations in between as well as their compliance to peace.

This study has concluded that although Jordan and Israel have been highly motivated to forge peaceful and functional relations, developments within the regional context of the Arab-Israeli conflict particularly the Israeli-Palestinian one, have been playing a detrimental role in shaping the pace and nature of the Jordanian-Israeli ties since signing their peace treaty in 1994. Since 1995 the lack of peace on the Israeli-Palestinian track and mutual violence have negatively impacted on Amman's relations with Tel Aviv. Therefore, although peace is relatively working between Israel and Jordan, a comprehensive settlement for the larger Arab-Israeli conflict particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, would positively impact on the pace of the ties between Jordan and Israel.

Keywords: Peace, Relations, Assessment, Behavioural Approach, Motives, Compliance, Subsequent Relations.

INTRODUCTION

Since the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1948, the international community has sought (without success) to help the disputants reach a comprehensive settlement. However, in 1991 an Arab-Israeli peace process was lunched and produced a number of agreements between Israel and some Arab parties. The chief one was the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994 that ended the state of war between both Amman and Israel and resolved their disputed issues. While the two countries have established diplomatic as well as functional relations, the quality of this peace agreement has fluctuated.

Amid the uncertainty that is looming over the peace prospects in the Middle East, particularly between Israel and Palestinians, the sixteenth anniversary of the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty has arrived. The continued stalemate between Israel and the Palestinians and the lack of peace between Tel Aviv and other Arab parties, particularly Syria, raised many questions, including whether peace agreements between Israel and some Arab countries, especially Jordan, are actually working or not? The anniversary of the Jordanian-Israeli treaty is an appropriate occasion to address this question. This study argues that although both parties have been highly

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motivated to forge peaceful and functional relations, developments within the regional context of the Arab-Israeli conflict particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been playing a detrimental role in shaping the pace and nature of the Jordanian-Israeli ties since the signing of their peace treaty in 1994. Moreover, although a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement has not been achieved yet, both Jordan and Israel continued to show their commitment to the peace treaty and that a mixture of up and downs has been characterising the order of Jordanian-Israeli relations. Therefore, to achieve the task of this study, an assessment and analyses to the Jordanian-Israeli peace agreement of 1994, and the parties' subsequent relationship as well as their compliance will be conducted. The importance of this study derived from the fact that it will investigate peace between Jordan and Israeli after sixteen years with an emphasise on the nature of their bilateral ties. Moreover, although the Israeli perspective will be discussed, this study will mainly focus on the Jordanian perspective.

Assessing peace agreements is a relatively problematic and complicated matter (Richard, 2000, p.330). That is because settlement outcome can be perceived differently by the negotiating parties, an outsider, or the mediator in case of a mediated settlement. Moreover, perceptions might change over time and what had been looked at as successful outcome at a certain time might be perceived as a failure later on. Furthermore, peace agreements can be judged in terms of success or failure according to the extent to which the agreements meet certain normative criteria such as fairness, legitimacy and efficiency. To avoid this complexity of evaluating peaceful settlements and the nature of the parties' subsequent relations, some scholars have advocated a behavioural approach that deals with the observed differences the negotiation and its outcome have on the parties' behaviour (Jacob, 1991, p.9). Negotiation can be perceived unsuccessful when no agreements were reached; partially successful when talks produced a cease-fire agreement and fully successful when agreements were reached on the majority of the main disputed issues and that the parties complied with the provisions of such agreements.

Josephine M. Zubek, Dean G. Pruitt, Robert S. Peirce, Neil B. McGillicuddy and Hellena Syna have advocated two ways to assess the success of a dispute settlement (Zubek, 1992, p.547). Short-term success is related to immediate outcomes that are observed at the time of the resolution. These results include whether the parties reach agreements that meet most of their interests. Long-term success is considered to have been achieved when delayed outcomes that are observable after an interval of time has passed (after the parties reached their agreement) meet the requirements of the participants. These requirements include the degree of compliance and the level of improvement in the parties' relations.

The normative approach would not have been appropriate to assist the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, its outcome and the degree of compliance. Although fairness, legitimacy, justice and efficiency, which are key elements of this approach, can be defined, each one of these notions can be interpreted in many ways. Therefore, an index that combined the aforementioned behavioural criteria and the short-term and long term-term success approach would be appropriate in judging the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and its impact on the parties' relations. Thus, the criteria with which to judge peace between Amman and Tel Aviv will be based on the short-term and long-term success approach and the "fully successful settlement" element of the behavioural approach. The components of this criterion are the agreements and the degree to which they have met the parties' goals, the solution to their disputed issues, and compliance and their subsequent relations. Therefore, this study will be divided into three sections so to meet the components of the abovementioned criterion. These sections are: The Jordanian-Israeli motives, the outcomes, the parties' compliance and the nature of their subsequent relations.

Motives of the Concerned Parties.

The term motived here refers to all significant interests and goals, which usually lead disputing parties

to enter and sustain a mediation-negotiation process to solve their conflict. Many of the scholars and practitioners in the field of conflict management have highlighted the importance of these motives in mediation and negotiation (Fisher, 1972, pp. 83-84).

Arthur Lall argued that "Although vital interests, as such, are not brought into negotiating forums very often, it is obvious that they must play an important part in negotiations."(Arthur, 1996, p.153).

Most of the writers about the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994 have underlined the great importance of motivation by Jordan and Israel in their negotiation. Zunes, Ryan, Cunningham and Peres even considered motives to be the decisive factors that led the parties to accept the U.S. peace initiative of 1991 and conclude their formal peace in 1994 (Stephen, 1995, p.57).

Jordan

Jordan had a number of interests that attracted it to join the Middle East peace process in 1991 and conclude peace with Israel in 1994. The chief one is Amman’s foreign policy aims, the political survival of the regime, and economic and security needs in which the Arab-Israeli conflict formed a major obstacle to these interests.

Jordan’s motives related to its political existence as a state. The Arab-Israeli conflict and its ramifications were the most serious threats to Jordan’s political stability, because geographically and demographically, it was the Arab country most affected by the conflict. These threats came mainly from Israel. As a result of the deep sense of insecurity existing in the minds of the Jordanian decision-makers, the aim of political survival was placed at the top of Jordan’s national interest hierarchy (Tal, 1997, pp. 102-105).

Amman’s political existence was seriously challenged when entering into two major wars with Israel in 1948 and 1967 and a limited engagement in 1968 at Al-Karamah. An additional Israeli threat derived from the belief of the right-wing Likud party, that Jordan was the best place for a solution to the Palestinian problem because the leaders of that party advocated that the Palestinian state should be formed in Jordan (Al-Jarbawi, 1995, p94-95). Moreover, in 1990/1, Jordan’s regional as well as international position was damaged by the spillover from the Gulf conflict which severely affected its relations with the Gulf States and Western countries (Al-Jarbawi, 1995, p576).

Jordan’s pro-Iraqi stance led to its political isolation at the Arab and international levels. However, the developments within the Middle East peace process particularly between Palestinians and Israelis in 1993 motivated Jordan to accelerate the peace process with Israel. The surprise Oslo agreement and the subsequent Cairo accord (1994) between Israel and the PLO served as a catalyst for the Jordanian-Israeli peace of 1994 (Tal, 1995, p. 104). In the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Oslo accords, the Jordanians concluded that their previous policy of waiting for progress on the other tracks had not paid off, and it had produced most undesirable consequences. Amman considered the Oslo declaration a major threat to its political and economic interests and a challenge to its strategic aims and future regional role (Susser, 1998, pp.10-17).

In addition to Israel’s recognition of the Palestinians, their legitimate political rights, the PLO as their representative, and the Oslo declaration provided for the establishment of a Palestinian authority (with responsibility for parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) with which a permanent solution to the Palestinian problem would be negotiated. Moreover, the agreement called for mutual co-ordination and economic co-operation between Israel and the Palestinians. Jordan felt it had been lost out in its competition with the PLO and that the Oslo agreement would hamper its ability to influence the future of the Palestinians and, therefore, the region. The immediate alternative for Jordan was to seek an agreement with Israel to prevent this occur (Susser, 1998, p.17).

Another important impact of the Oslo agreement on the Jordanian-Israeli peace talks was the fact that these accords removed the almost sacrosanct taboo against breaking pan-Arab ranks and dealing openly with Israel (Susser, 1998, pp. 13-17). The PLO legitimized the idea

that a separate agreement with Israel was no longer reason as was also true when Egypt made peace with Israel. Once chairman Arafat began negotiations with Israel, he freed King Hussein from responsibility for the Palestinian people and led him realize that the time was ripe for an Israeli-Jordanian agreement. All the aforementioned threats formed the political interests which prompted Jordan to participate in the peace process and conclude peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Peace with Israel would result in a mutual political recognition, which would enhance, safeguard Jordan's political stability, and eliminate Israeli right-wing ambitions in its territories. Moreover, participating in a peace process sponsored by the U.S. would also satisfy the Jordanian position that believed in the necessity of active American involvement in any proposed Arab-Israeli negotiations.

Successful talks would allow Jordan to restore cordial relations with the West, and the Arab Gulf States, which would enhance their political status. Furthermore, peace with Israel would curtail any potential impact of Oslo agreements between Israel and the Palestinians on Amman's interests. Unlike some of its neighbouring countries, Jordan is a small country with limited natural resources (Susser, 1998, p. 13).

In terms of mineral resources, Jordan is a relatively poor country except in phosphates and potash. As for agriculture, Jordan is a semi-desert country which depends mainly on rainfall as the source of irrigation. Therefore, since its establishment, it has been dependent on foreign aid to meet her economic needs. This situation has caused fluctuations in its economy, which became highly vulnerable to developments in the external environment. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the regional developments were the factors that most seriously affected economic conditions in Jordan.

The Gulf crisis of 1990 had a devastated impact on the Jordanian economy. Amman almost lost its traditional financial and economic supporters, mainly the West and the Gulf countries. Thousands of Jordanian workers returned home mainly from Kuwait, which in time increased the rate of unemployment. Moreover, Jordan lost the Gulf market and the Iraqi one as well as a result of the UN economic sanctions. However, after the second Gulf War, the political development in the region, mainly the U.S. peace initiative, formed a propitious opportunity for Jordan to get out of this critical economic situation. Participating in a peace process that might result in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict would allow Jordan to achieve short and long-term economic aims. One of the former was the lifting of the Aqaba port blockade. The latter is Jordan's sole port which was besieged as a result of the UN sanctions against Iraq in that goods coming through it had to be searched. Another was the restoration of economic relations with the West and the Gulf countries and the possibility of writing off a substantial amount of its foreign debt, mainly by the United States (Lawrence, 1993, p.186).

In the long term a successful peace process would eliminate the negative impact of the conflict on Jordan's economy such as military expenditure and the migration of thousands of refugees and displaced persons. Moreover, a successful peace process would open up prospects for regional economic co-operation.

The geographical location of Jordan, in which she is surrounded by relatively strong countries, made it difficult to safeguard her security (Geoffrey & Pressman, 1997, p97). She had Israel to the west, Syria to the north, Saudi Arabia to the east and south and Iraq to east. In term of security threats, since its establishment, Jordan has suffered from direct military confrontations and from terrorist actions. Many of these threats came as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict while others relate to the developments in the region, most notably inter-Arab rivalry. Jordanians viewed Israel as the major threat to their security whether directly or indirectly as a result of its military confrontation with the other parties in the conflict (Brand, 1991, P.23). Therefore, Jordan believed that peace with Israel would eliminate the latter's potential security threat to Jordan and would put an end to the Likud illusions, which consequently would enhance Amman's stability (Bearman, 1995, p.130).

Moreover, comprehensive peace negotiations might

result in mutual agreements between the concerned Arab parties and Israel that would end the state of war among them. Such a development would relieve Jordan from its security commitments with the Arab countries against Israel and might even result in regional co-operation in the security field. In addition to this, a peace process with active U.S. involvement would lead to greater American commitment in terms of helping Jordan maintain its security.

Israel

When Israel participated in the peace process of 1991 and concluded peace treaty with Jordan in 1994, it was motivated by a number of related aims, chief among them being security which most of the Israelis have considered their top national priority (Barak, 1995, pp. 60-62). Jordan did not constitute a serious military threat to Israel because of its relative weakness as compared with the latter. But Jordan's geographical location formed an ideal military base that could be used to launch an effective attack against Israel (Evron, 1995, p.163). That is because Jordan has the longest borderline with Israel. Moreover, the latter lacks strategic depth in that the distance from its border with Jordan to the Mediterranean coast was quite short.

The unpredictability which characterised the Arab-Israeli conflict, led Israel to believe that Jordanian territory might be used by the other Arab countries, mainly Syria and Iraq as a launching base against her. Therefore, peace with Jordan would and the end the formal state of war which would reduce the likelihood of Arab forces being stationed in Jordan or might even result in formal security co-operation between Jordan and Israel (York, 1990, p.11). Moreover, and of great importance to Israel, peace with Jordan would reinforce U.S. security commitments to Israel (Safran, 1969, pp.23-28).

Nonetheless, the major political motived that led Israel to participate in the 1991 Middle East peace talks and to conclude peace with Jordan in 1994 was to get the Arab political recognition. Right from the beginning Israel was confronted with the problem of international and regional recognition, mainly from the Arab countries who challenged its political existence (Mc Laurin & Wagner, 1977, p. 204-205). Thus, political recognition has been considered as one of the most important aims in Israel's foreign policy agenda (Ikle, 1977, p.365). Therefore, peace with the Arab parties particularly with Jordan would put an end to their political boycott and legitimise its existence as a Jewish state (Weizman, 1998, p.53).

When Israel decided to participate in the peace process of 1991 and conclude peace with Jordan in 1994, it was hoping achieve short and long term economic interests. Since its inception, the state has been economically challenged by the Arab countries, which, in 1949, decided to establish a boycott bureau to be supervised by a head office located in Damascus (Paul, 1997, pp. 196-203). Moreover, the military nature of the conflict required a great deal of expenditure that imposed an immense burden on the Israeli economy (Zunes, 1995,p. 57). Therefore, Israel believed that peace with the Arab parties particularly with Jordan would help end the Arab economic boycott which might lead to mutual economic co-operation. The preceding discussion of the Jordanian-Israeli, suggests that both countries had compelling motives to conclude peace in 1994, reflected in the significant interests which both hoped to achieve.

The Outcomes

In terms of agreements reached, the Jordanian-Israeli negotiation produced three accords: the Common Agenda in 1993, the Washington Declaration in July 1994, and the Peace Treaty in October 1994. These accords have tackled and solved the parties' bilateral disputed issues which subsequently put an end to their dispute and the state of war. From a strictly bilateral perspective, the treaty with Israel met most of Jordan's demands about its occupied territories, water, security and Jerusalem (Zunes, 1995, p57). This was supported by the late King Hussein who argued that the peace between Jordan and Israel has secured the international boundary between the two countries, and Jordan

recovered its occupied territories as well as its water rights (King Hussein Bin Talal, 1996, p77). Indeed, Dr Abdual Salam Al-Majali, the Jordanian chief negotiator, has noted that Jordan got what it wanted and more from the peace process with Israel (Al-Majali , 2007).

Apart from solving the disputed issues, peace with Israel has secured most of the Jordanian political, security and economic interests. As a result of the peace treaty Jordan put an end to the "Jordan is Palestine" formula that was advocated by some Israeli political groups, particularly Likud (Susser, 1999, p.22). This issue can be contested in the sense that some Israelis particularly at the far right continued to propogate such advocacy however at the official level one would argued that this formula has not been raised after the conclusion of the peace treaty.

The Jordanian-Israeli peace process and its outcome also enabled Jordan to restore its cordial relations with the U.S. which enhanced Jordan's regional role and paved the way for reconciliation with the Gulf States. Peace with Israel resulted in an American commitment to Jordan's security and in providing its with military aid. The immediate economic interest that Jordan secured, as a result of peace with Israel was the American pledge to write off $700 million debt, U.S. economic assistance and military hardware (Geoffrey and Pressman, 1997, p.99). In addition to that, peace with Israel provided Jordan with potential political leverage over the determination of the future of the West Bank and Gaza. This was because of the Israeli commitment to give high priority to Jordan concerning the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem and the pledge that Jordan would be party to the final status negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians on the refugee issue (Susser,1999, pp. 26-27).

The provisions of the peace treaty with Israel, particularly Articles 4 and 11 put to rest many Jordanian security concerns and reduced the Israeli threat (Jordan-Israel Treaty of Peace, 1994). The parties' commitment not to allow the "involuntary movement" of people eliminated Jordan's longstanding fear of an Israeli transfer of Palestinians to the East Bank. The treaty also opened up prospects for economic co-operation with Israel and secured Jordan's economic interests in Israel and the West Bank.

From an Israeli point of view, peace with Jordan and its outcome has achieved its objectives and that was a balanced peace (Rabin, 1994). With regard to the disputed issues, Israel secured the interests of the Israeli farmers in the land regained by Jordan through the special regime that both countries agreed upon (Susser, 1999, p20). Recognising Jordan's special role over the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem has not affected Israel's claim to sovereignty over the whole city (Rabin, 1994). Furthermore, the acknowledgement of the peace treaty that the Arab-Israeli conflict gave rise to human problems on both sides and that Jordan and Israel agreed to implement UN programmes regarding refugees, raised the possibility of resettlement of most of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan. This satisfied Israel's interests in the refugee issue. Apart from Israeli satisfaction with the solution of the disputed issues with Jordan, peace with the latter has met Israel's political, economic and security interests (Rabin, 1994). Peace with Jordan resulted in the latter's recognition of Israel which consolidated the status of the Israeli state in the region. Apart from peace agreements with the Palestinians, peace with Jordan opened up prospects for Arab-Israeli reconciliation and further increased Israel's ties internationally (Kemp and Pressman, 1997, p.21).

From an Israeli point of view, an important element of the peace treaty with Jordan was its commitment not to allow a third country to deploy forces in its territories in a way that could threaten Israel's integrity and security (Shalim, 2000, p543). This pledge met Israeli security interests and eliminated its security concerns with regard to Jordan. Furthermore, peace with Jordan opened the prospects for mutual Israeli-Jordanian economic interaction and enhanced the likelihood of Israeli-Arab economic co-operation. A comparison between the aforementioned discussion and the Jordanian-Israeli motives reveals that both countries have achieved their bilateral interests in the short-term as a result of their peace talks of 1991-1994.

Compliance and the Parties' Subsequent Relations

The immediate compliance of Jordan and Israel with their agreements was impressive (Shalim, 2000, p544). Both countries started a process of implementation to the provisions of their peace agreements such as establishing diplomatic relations, exchanging ambassadors, opening tourist crossing points on their borders and establishing joint economic projects (Lukacs, 1997, p.196). Moreover, contacts between leaders of the two countries become frequent and public. Furthermore, at the level of regional integration both countries had actively participated in the first Middle East/North Africa economic summit that was convened in Morocco/Casablanca and the second conference which was held in Amman in which most of the Arab countries participated (Kemp and Pressman, 1997, p.30).

Such acceleration in the normalization of relations between Amman and Tel Aviv projected the image that one of two states long at peace. However, although the treaty was ratified by the Israeli Kenesst and the Jordanian parliament, peace with Tel Aviv remained some how a problematic on the Jordanian public level. The opposition had continued its rejection and intensified its efforts to convince Jordanians that peace with Israel is a threat to their national interests therefore; they should resist normalization of the relations with Tel Aviv.

The assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 and the subsequent developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process at large particularly Palestinian-Israeli peace track had impacted the Jordanian-Israeli relations, causing to suffer ups and downs (King Abdullah II, 2010). King Hussein and Premier Rabin had developed impressive personal acquaintance and a strong friendship during their peace talks that helped greatly the parties to end their conflict and normalize relations (Lynch, 1999, pp.207-209). However, Shimon Peres succeeded Rabin as a prime minister. Perse did not enjoy enough popularity to fill the leadership vacuum in Israel that was created as a result of Rabin assassination.

Although Perse was committed to carry the peace process forward particularly with the Palestinians, he was confronted with serious challenges from Hamas as well as Hezbollah in south Lebanon (Lynch, 1999, pp. 209-210). Perse approved the assassination of a Hamas leader in January 1995 that made the Islamic movement to conduct several suicide attacks inside Israeli cities. Moreover, a military confrontation took place between Israel and Hezbollah in April 1996 where many Lebanese civilians lost their lives that triggered international condemnation to Israel. These developments had undermined Perse credibility and weakened his popularity that made him lose the Israeli general elections on 19 May 1996 despite the support he received from the American administration.

Binyamin Netanyahu become a prime minister and formed a Likud-led coalition government. At the beginning, many in Israel and Jordan had the belief that such development would impact positively the relations between both countries in the sense that Netanyahu had developed good relations with King Hussein as a result of those several meetings that took place between the two leaders prior to the Israeli general elections of 1996 (Bligh , 2002, p196). However, this sense of belief proved to be invalid later on as a result of those developments that took place within the ongoing Arab-Israeli peace process particularly Netanyahu's reluctance to carry forward peace with Palestinians. Netanyahu came to power with an approach based on lowering of Palestinian expectations and not acknowledging their national self-determination as well as his negative image of the Arabs, and particularly Syria where he was determined not to proceed any further down the path of "land for peace".

Many political as well as security steps that were taken by Netanyahu,s government negatively influenced the Israeli-Jordanian relations and put the peace treaty into real test. In late September 1996 Israel decided to open the Western Wall Tunnel in Jerusalem which triggered violent riots in all Palestinian areas as well as a Jordanian rejection to such action. Amman viewed Israeli provocative step as a violation to Muslims rights as well as to Jordan special role over holy sites in the

city. USA intervened and conducted a summit meeting in Washington with the participation of all concerned parties including Jordan where King Hussein voiced his disappointment with Netanyahu (Shlaim , 2007, pp. 561-562). The Washington summit meeting was successful in the sense that it eased and ended the crisis. Despite the Israeli action, King Hussein continued his efforts so to help the Israelis and the Palestinians move forward in their peace talks. In January 1997, the King paid the first official visit of any Arab leader to the Palestinian Authority(PA) and also visited Israel at the same time (Alexander, 2002 , p.197). Shortly after these efforts helped the parties to sign an agreement regarding Israeli deployment in Hebron.

Another crisis occurred in early 1997 that caused further disruption to the Jordanian-Israeli relations when Israel insisted on continuing a major building project that Amman rejected. The King indeed sent two messages late February and lat March to Netanyahu urging him to stop such project (Shalim, 2007, pp. 565-568). Amid of this situation another crisis emerged when a Jordanian soldier killed a group of Israeli schoolgirls while they were an area near the borders. The King skilfully managed to contain such incident when he visited the families of the girls who were killed (Shalim, 2007, p.569). This humanitarian gesture captured the Israeli hearts and minds and resulted in the alleviation of the tension and resumption of normal relations between the two countries. However, in late September 1997 a serious security crisis erupted between Amman and Tel Aviv when Israeli secret service agents tried to assassinate one of the leaders of Hamas, Mr Khaled Masha'al in Amman (Shalim, 2007). This security blunder made by Netanyahu’s government on Jordanian soil was considered as a serious breach to the peace treaty and brought relations between the two countries into the lowest point since the signing of their peace treaty in October 1994 (Alexander, 2002, p.199). The Israeli action made the King very angry where he threatened to cancel the treaty and storm Israeli embassy so to arrest the rest of the agents who escaped to it.

The crisis only resolved when Israeli government agreed to provide the antidote that saved the life of Masha'al and Jordan released the Israeli agents in exchange for Hamas leader Shakeh Ahmed Yasin. Although this episode impacted negatively the Jordanian-Israeli relations, Amman continued its efforts so help Israelis and Palestinians to move on in their peace talks. In March and April 1998 contacts and meetings between the King and Netanyahu took place in order to contain the damage resulted from MOSAD attempt to kill Masha’al and break stalemate between Israelis and Palestinians (Lynch, pp213-214). Despite his illness King Hussein joined US mediated peace talks at Wye River in mid-October 1998 between Israelis and Palestinians where both parties signed Wye River agreement. This was the last contribution from the part of the King before his death in February 1999 who was succeeded by his son King Abdullah the II.

Although the new King had made assurances that he was committed to peace with Israel and the Middle East peace process at large, no serious improvement in the Jordanian-Israeli relations was showed (King Abdullah II, 2010). The geopolitical developments within Middle East, particularly Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued to overshadow Amman’s relations with Tel Aviv. Some steps were taken to move the relations ahead such as Netanyahu’s visit to Jordan where he met the King (Fisher, 2004, p.655). The visit was over shadowed by comments made earlier by Netanyahu that Jordan is about to cement its relations with Iraq that could negatively impact relations with Israel. Soon after another issue caused further disruption in the relations when Israel suggested that it would not be able to supply Jordan with the full amount of water supplies that was agreed up on under the peace treaty of 1994. Jordan rejected this and demanded that Tel Aviv fulfil its commitments. Later on Israel agreed to supply the agreed on amount of water supplies (Fisher, 2004, p.655).

On the public level anti-normalization groups in Amman continued their opposition to peace treaty with Israel as well as normalizing Jordan’s relations with Tel Aviv (Al-O'ran, 2006,pp. 4-6). However, development within Israeli domestic politics however, opened new

prospects to improve bilateral relation when a labour-led government was formed and Ehud Barak become a prime Minister in July 1999. In Mid July of that year King Abdullah the II met with the new Israeli Premier and discussed ways to revive the stalled peace process. This was followed by series of meetings between Jordanian as well as Israel officials to advance bilateral cooperation over security, transport, tourism, and communications (Fisher, 2004, pp. 655-656). Furthermore, Israeli-Palestinian peace talks were revived and both parties with the help of Egypt signed Sharam El sheikh memorandum related to carrying out Wye River accord of 1998. However, two incidents that took place in October 1999 and Mid February 2000 impacted negatively the positive momentum that Jordanian-Israeli relations gained as a result of change in the Tel Aviv domestic politics (Fisher, 2004, pp. 655-656). The first incident related to a visit made by a Jordanian Parliamentarian delegation to Hebron where they received verbal abuse from Israeli settlers. The second development was when Israel launched airstrikes against Lebanon in February 2000 which was condemned immediately by Jordan. These developments led the King to postpone his scheduled visit to Israel which was suppose to be made in February. However, in April 2000 the King made his first official visit to Israel where he met Barak at Ellat and discussed ways to push forward peace talks with the Palestinians as well as bilateral issues like water (Fisher, 2004, p.655).

In July 2000, mediated peace talks started between Israelis and Palestinians at Camp David where they were invited by US president Bill Clinton to discuss final status issues which received a Jordanian support (Russell and Zasloff, p.4). However, these talks failed to produce any tangible results that led to the eruption of the second Palestinian Uprising (*Al-Aqsa Intifada*). Although at the public level Jordanians anger was expressed sharply in the support of the Palestinians, Amman's position concerning the failure of Camp David II peace talks and the eruption of the second uprising was that Jordan maintaining diplomatic contact and relations with Israel would better serve the Palestinians and the peace process (Fisher, 2004, p.656).

The failure and the subsequent violence between Palestinians and Israelis caused serious disruption to the bilateral relations between Israel and Jordan. Attempts and efforts were made from the part of the US to curtail the negative ramifications of the failure of the talks at Camp David II. Therefore, talks were held between Egyptian President, Ehud Barak and King Abdullah the II at Sharm El Sheikh on 16-17 October (Abdul, 2010). The King invested huge efforts to resume Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and met the Israeli Premier three times. These efforts made by the King reflected Jordan's keen efforts to achieve peace and limit any potential ramifications of the deteriorated situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on Jordan. The Jordanian Government was put under tremendous pressure by the Jordanian public and different political as well as professional groups who urged the Government to sever relations with Israel and abolish the peace treaty.

The Al Aqsa Uprising and the way that Israel dealt with, had a profound impact on the Jordanian internal situation that boosted the activities of the anti-normalization groups such as popular protests and demonstrations, and two shooting incidents took place against Israeli diplomats in Jordan late 2000 (Fisher, 2004, pp. 656-657). These popular reactions complicated the government position and forced it to take symbolic steps such as not dispatch the newly appointed Jordanian Ambassador to Israel.

Towards 2001 and 2002 international and regional geopolitical developments particularly the continued hostilities and violence between Palestinians and Israelis continued to influence the pace of the Jordanian-Israeli relations. Ariel Sharon who developed a reputation of being tough on the Palestinians won an overwhelming victory in the prime ministerial election (Sasley, 2002, pp. 3-4). Sharon had vowed to deal firmly with the Palestinian Uprising and increase Israeli settlement on the West Bank and Jerusalem. Moreover, George W. Bush won the US presidential election who had promised less US involvement in peace talks between Arabs and Israelis. These developments created

additional confusion and uncertainty in the Arab world regarding the future of the peace process. An Arab League summit was held in Amman on 27-28 March 2001 in which Arab leaders had discussed the current situation as well as ways and means to support the Palestinians. Moreover, Jordan and Egypt had accelerated their peace efforts and submitted a peace plan which was a modification to the plan that was agreed upon in Sharm El-Sheikh summit in October 2000 (Mahdi, 2001,). The Plan was accepted by the Palestinians and the Israelis who demanded certain changes. It also received the backing of the USA and the Europeans. However, the plan failed to end the violence in occupied territories and the resumption of peace talks between Palestinian and Israelis.

The increased violence in West Bank and Gaza, and Israeli counter measures against the Palestinians made Jordanians to continue their popular protests where the anti-normalizations and opposition political parties continued their demands that Amman should sever its diplomatic relations with Israel (Paul L. and Lucas , 2001, pp. 6-7). This put Jordanian government under tremendous pressure. Jordanian government was in a critical situation between the demands of its people, realities of the conflict particularly its commitments towards Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty and its dependence on close relations with Washington. Therefore, the Government adopted a pragmatic approach where it intensified its diplomatic efforts towards the USA urging Washington to force Israel withdraw its troops from Palestinian cities and at the same time keeping diplomatic channels with Israel open in the hope that it would be able to pressure Tel Aviv. Moreover, Jordan intensified its close coordination with concerned Arab countries particularly with Egypt and Saudi Arabia and engaged in Arab joint efforts to help Palestinians and revive peace talks with Israel. Amman actively participated in the articulation of the Arab Peace Initiative that was adopted in 2002 at Beirut Arab Summit (Cossal, 2004, pp. 30-31).

During 2003 and 2004 relations between Israel and Jordan continued to be strained as result of the Palestinian Uprising, Israeli counter measures in the occupied territories and lack of peace between Palestinians and Israelis. Amman rejected and condemned these steps including the construction of the separation wall in the West Bank in the sense that such Israeli action would lead to mass Palestinian emigration which would threaten Jordan security. However, despite such strained relations diplomatic and security contacts continued and both countries took some steps that would help in establishing new ground. On March 2004 both countries have established a joint scientific and educational centre “Bridging the Rift Centre” with the help of Stanford and Cornell universities in the USA (Fisher, 2004, p.664).

Although opposition political parties and the anti normalization groups continued to express support to the Palestinians and their opposition to peace with Israel, the level of popular protests and demonstrations had declined in the Jordanian cities. This could be attributed to the decline level of violence in the Palestinian territories and that people apparently become unwilling to risk violent confrontation with the Jordanian authorities whom they took several measures to curb these protests and demonstration. Moreover, Jordanian authorities took certain steps to ease the life of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and began to deliver humanitarian aid and relief supplies gathered from Jordan and other Arab countries.

On the diplomatic front King Abdullah intensified his efforts through out 2003 and 2004 so to end the stalemate in the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis. For instance it was reported that on 18 March 2004 the King had met with Sharon secretly at the latter ranch in the Negeve desert where the talks had focused on how to push peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis, and on Jordanian concerns that there would be a mass Palestinian refugees as a result of the separation wall (Fisher, 2004, pp. 664-665). Moreover, during 2003 and 2004 the King had visited USA many times where he met American official, Congress men and business men. The King also met President Bush on 6 May 2004 and discussed issues of common concerns such as

economic and financial aid to Jordan in addition to the necessity of carrying out the Road Map which was drafted by the Quartet Group and presented to the Israelis and Palestinians on 30 April 2003 (Fisher, 2004, p665). The King also received assurances on the US position towards the creation of a viable Palestinian state However, relations with Israel continued to be strained as violence and lack of peace between Israelis and Palestinians characterized the rest of 2004.

Although Israeli and Jordanian statistics related to bilateral economic and trade cooperation contrast with each others, the enthusiasm for fruitful economic and trade ties between Israel and Jordan that was generated after the signing of the peace treaty had in time declined particularly after 2000. An Israeli study suggested that after the peace treaty of 1994 Tel Aviv became an important exporter to Jordanian markets and that Israel was the fifth most important destination for Jordan exports, however it declined later on particularly 2003 and 2004 (Gal, 2004,).

2005 and 2006 witnessed relative improvement in the Jordanian-Israeli relation as a result of some developments particularly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinian president Yasser Arafat died on 11 November 2004 who later on was succeeded by Mohamud Abass (Cossal, 2006, pp. 31-32). Israeli and American officials blamed Arafat for the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in 2000 at Camp David and the subsequent violence that was erupted after that. Therefore, Arafat was marginalized, isolated and was considered as an obstacle for peace. Mahmud Abbas who has been considered as a moderate Palestinian leader by both Israelis and Americans succeeded Arafat and later on was elected as a Palestinian President. Subsequently a mood of optimism was generated in the region to end violence and start a meaningful Palestinian-Israeli negotiation. On 8 February 2005 a summit meeting took place between Abbas and Sharon on Sharm El Shiekh which was also attended by King Abdulla II and Egyptian President (Cossal, 2006, p.32).

The summit resulted in a number of agreements chief among them was the mutual cease-fire announcement, release of 900 Palestinians prisoners as well as Israeli troops withdrawal from certain quieter areas in the West Bank. Such progress had prompted Jordan to announce that it would be returning its Ambassador to Tel Aviv whom he was withdrawn earlier in a protest at Israeli actions against Palestinians (Cossal, 2006, p32). Moreover, Jordanian officials continued to maintain diplomatic contacts with their Israeli counter-parts with full-fledged support to Palestinian National Authority under the leadership of Mahmud Abbas who started to face a growing challenge from the part of HAMAS movement. King Abdullah II met with Shimon Peres the Israeli deputy prime minister on June 2006 where both leaders discussed issues of common concerns and in the following day the King had hosted an informal meeting for the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas in Petra in order to push forward the peace process (Fisher, 2004, pp. 603-606). This relative improvement in the Jordanian-Israeli relations was overshadowed by the continued violence mainly in Gaza and the military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel in July 2006. The July War generated public anger against Israel and prompted anti-normalization groups to intensify its calls to sever diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, however, Amman's relations with Israel managed to survive this war.

The Jordanian-Israeli relations continued to suffer from a mixture of ups and downs mainly due to the increased complexity in the domestic politics of both Israel and the Palestinians. Moreover, although violence had declined in the West Bank, Gaza particularly after the wining of Hamas to the Palestinian general elections reminds an arena for mutual violence between Palestinians and Israel. In addition to that Israeli society become divided and moved towards the right and Israeli domestic politics become fragmented. Labour party, Jordan's favourite peace partner, in time lost its popularity and Likud was split where Sharon, before his serious illness, along with Ehud Olmert and a number of their colleagues formed a new party called Kadima (Cossal, 2006, p. 35). Hopes were renewed when George Bush had proposed to convene a peace conference in

Annapolis in the USA where it was held in late November 2007 with the participation of Israel, a number of Arab countries including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and attended by the Quartet Group, Russia and many European countries (Philips, 2007). The conference emphasised the two states solution to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and for a comprehensive settlement for the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. The conference failed to hammer out a meaningful peace process like that of Madrid conference in 1991 and hopes were dashed. Moreover, Jordanian-Israeli relations had faced serious challenges during 2007 and 2008. Chief among them was the military confrontation (Gaza War) took place between Hamas and Israel who invaded Gaza in December 2008 and lasted more than 20 days

The War at Gaza placed Jordan in a critical situation (Anthony H. and Burke, 2009, pp. 78-79). Although Hamas relations with the Jordanian government have been tense since late 90's, Amman left with no option but to strongly condemned the Israeli military actions and asked Tel Aviv to immediately end its military operations in Gaza. However, the indeterminate end of the fighting, further deterioration of the Palestinian situation and the impact of civilian casualties and collateral damage in Gaza as a result of the Israeli military escalation in Gaza left Jordan with more problems than when the fighting had begun. Popular anger against Israel was higher, prospects for a full peace diminished, and no clear end game was in sight. Thousands of people conducted daily demonstrations and public protests demanding that Amman should sever its diplomatic relations with Israel and Jordanian MP‘s burned an Israeli flag inside the Jordanian parliament (Anthony H. and Burke, 2009, p79).

In the after math of the War Jordan, started an immediate humanitarian aid and sent a fully equipped field hospital to Gaza. Although the war caused serious damage to the Jordanian-Israeli relations, Jordan's peace efforts continued in the aftermath of the war. King Abdullah continued to call for a peace settlement, a called he repeated when he met with President Obama‘s new envoy, George Mitchell in Amman in early February2009. The King called for immediate, serious and effective, peace negotiations to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the basis of the two-state solution. A royal court statement stated that, King Abdullah asserted that the setting up of an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian national soil in accordance with the international legitimacy resolutions and the Arab peace initiative is a pre-requisite for the attainment of security for all (people) in the region.

Since 2007 Jordanian-Israeli bilateral relations can be best described as fragile and stunted ties with the continuation of diplomatic contacts and certain aspects of security coordination so to regulate their relations. The level of security coordination between Jordan and Israel is very difficult to validate clearly as the reality is that most cooperation between Amman and Tel Aviv occurs largely out of the public eye for fear of social repercussions. In addition to the impact of lack of peace some bilateral issues caused further strained in the Jordanian-Israeli relations. The electing of Benjamin Netanyahu as an Israeli Prime Minister in 2009, whom he formed a collation government dominated by right wing parties as well as the Israeli provocative measures in the West Bank and Jerusalem, caused serious fears in Jordan (Al-Sharif, 2010). The expanding of settlements building especially in East Jerusalem and the fear that Likud government intends to deport Palestinians (through "transfer policy") fuelled the Jordanian public anger and revived the deeply-seated fears of the Jordan-is-Palestine Option which has been advocated by hardliners in the Israeli right wing groups (Ma'ayeh,). Moreover, the King himself become very critical to Israel and expressed his frustration with Tel Aviv's intransigence over the peace process, its ignorance to the two-state solution and the building of settlements in the Palestinian occupied territories.

This would undermine the chances of peace on the bases of two-state solution and create lack of political trust with Israel (King Abdulla II, 2009). Moreover, Jordan considers Israeli settlements expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem to be a threat to its

national security, as it could lead to annexation of significant portions of the Palestinian territories including East Jerusalem. Apart from the aforementioned disturbing issues another issue that surfaced and cause additional disturbance to the Jordanian-Israeli relations related to the Jordanian nuclear bid. King Abdullah the II has accused Israeli of trying to block Jordan from developing a peaceful nuclear programme through pressuring some countries like France and South Korea not to sell Amman nuclear technology. The King stated that" There are countries, Israel in particular, that are more worried about us being economically independent than issue of nuclear energy…..there are many such reactors in the world and a lot more coming, so the Israelis must go mind their own business" (Stewart, 2010).

Despite the resumption of the proximity talks between Palestinian-Israelis, Amman's relations with Israel remind cold and meetings on leadership level almost frozen therefore, lately the relations can b described as a strained relations

Conclusion

The Aforementioned analyses suggest that although a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement has not been materialised yet, both Jordan and Israel continued to show their commitment to the peace treaty despite highs and laws in their bilateral relations. Despite these ups and downs, relations between Jordan and Israel survived serious crises, contacts at the official level continued and officials in both countries have been convinced that peace is necessary and that it is the geopolitical rational of their bilateral relations. However, at the public level particularly Jordanian public, peace and normalizations with Israel remained a debatable and contentious issue. The Jordanian public debated the meaning of peace with Tele Aviv, its impact on the Jordan's identity as well as its interests where a consensus was produced against the peace agreement. This is mainly because of the changes in the Israeli behaviour towards peace particularly with the Palestinians and the economic dimension of peace failed to materialise. Although the balance sheet is not wholly negative, economic and commercial ties between Jordan and Israel have been a mixture of achievements, failures and unrealized dreams. Most of the high expectations that were generated right after the signing of the peace treaty-peace would bring large scale foreign investment and joint projects- have in time faded away

This study has concluded that although Jordan and Israel have been highly motivated to forge peaceful and functional relations, developments within the regional context of the Arab-Israeli conflict particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have been playing a detrimental role in shaping the pace and nature of the Jordanian-Israeli ties since the signing of their peace treaty in 1994. Since 1995 the lack of peace on the Israeli-Palestinian track and continued mutual violence has negatively impacted Amman's relations with Tel Aviv. Therefore, although peace is relatively working between Israel and Jordan, a comprehensive settlement for the larger Arab-Israeli conflict particularly Israeli-Palestinian conflict would positively impact the pace of the ties between the two countries.

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تقييم معاهدة السلام الأردنية الإسرائيلية (1994) وتحليلها من منظور اردني بعد 16 عاماً من توقيعها

*حسن محمد حسين المومني**

ملخـص

تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تقييم معاهدة السلام الأردنية الإسرائيلية التي عقدت عام 1994 وتحليلها، من حيث درجة الالتزام بها، إضافة إلى طبيعة العلاقات الثنائية التي سادت بين البلدين منذ التوقيع ولغاية الآن، وذلك من خلال التركيز على المنظور الأردني. وقد قامت الدراسة على عدة فرضيات أهمها، أنه، وبالرغم من وجود دوافع كبيرة لدى الطرفين لعقد معاهدة سلام وإقامة علاقات طبيعية بينهما، إلاّ أن تطورات البيئة الإقليمية للصراع العربي الإسرائيلي، وبالذات الصراع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي قد لعب دوراً أساسياً في تحديد مسار العلاقات الثنائية بين البلدين وطبيعتها.

لقد استخدمت هذه الدراسة المنهج السلوكي ضمن إطار منهجي تحليلي، من أجل التقييم والدراسة. حيث إن الجزء الأكبر من هذه الدراسة قد انصب على المعاهدة؛ الدوافع الرئيسة للأطراف من أجل إقامة علاقات وظيفية، إضافة إلى تحديد طبيعة العلاقات الثنائية فيما بعد توقيع المعاهدة، ودرجة الالتزام بها.

ولقد توصلت الدراسة إلى عدة نتائج، أهمها، أنه بالرغم من وجود السلام النسبي بين إسرائيل والأردن، فإن الحل الشامل للصراع العربي الإسرائيلي، وخاصة للصراع الفلسطيني الإسرائيلي، هو الذي سوف يؤثر إيجابياً في بناء علاقات طبيعية بن الأردن وإسرائيل.

الكلمات الدالة: السلام، العلاقات، تقييم، المنهج السلوكي، دوافع، التزام، العلاقات اللاحقة.

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